The co-editors of the present volume invite the scholars who urgently need to re-think the problem of axiological and evaluative aspects of the criteria by means of which knowledge is to be had. The controversy is not new and Plato’s arguments against the Sophists were influential amongst many philosophers throughout the centuries that followed. However, what is enormous today is the scale of the controversy, and, if there were a litmus test available for measuring the intensity of debates at various times and places, it might appear that nowadays thinkers are, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, preoccupied with this issue much more than with others, especially in the face of the intellectual agitation evoked by post-humanism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, post-colonialism, post-historicism, etc., all so suspicious towards the assumptions upon which one can justify ontological realism, epistemological objectivism, ethical absolutism, and anthropological rationalism.

On having taken a quick look at the present state of the debate, one can enumerate at least three reasons that make is possible for contemporary philosophers to claim more openly than before, that any criteria by means of which we are able to obtain the knowledge about the world, fail to avoid axiological assumptions and evaluative preconditions.

The first reason and anthropological is, that these are human criteria, rendered by human language, and to be used to human aims and human interests that we talk about; additionally, one can claim, that it is a result of evaluation that these are the human minds that are (most) able to provide us with the (most) objective criteria and the most reliable ways to reach the truth.

The second and cultural is, that these are the scholars, rather than priests, mystics, sages, and artists (poets, men of letter), who are best predisposed to tell us the truth about the world; then, the higher or lower status of science, rather than of religion and of the arts, as a reliable means of reaching the truth, would itself be a matter of evaluation.

The third and methodological is, that we have to select the best theory out of many at hand, which means that we do evaluate their completeness, applicability, and clarity, and, next, choose one. In the age of multiculturalism and methodological pluralism, where various incompatible “discourses”, side by side, strife for recognition, there is hardly any meta-criterion, by means of which it would be possible for us to judge the thing in an unbiased manner.

American Pragmatism, since its appearance on philosophical scene, has always been an important voice in the discussion. It argues that the criteria of knowledge are contextualized to the social, cultural, and historical conditions, that the cognitive results are temporary and changeable, rather than final and definite, and that knowledge must refer to the practice of human activity.

Interestingly, American Pragmatism was known to most eminent Polish thinkers and hardly appreciated by them. Thus, Jan Łukasiewicz, gave a speech about William James’ Pragmatism -- just after it was published -- at a meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov, in 1907. He called James’ ideas fresh and animating, however, he claimed that logical strictness is not his strong side, and that the book should be read with criticism, and added that, for Pragmatists the convictions are true when they facilitate easy and comfortable actions. Łukasiewicz was not alone in seeing Pragmatism this way; likewise, for Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Pragmatism was not only associated with logical and philosophical carelessness, but also with moral relativism that it narrowed down to the efficiency of practical activity, something sounding rather dangerous because of the lack of a stable moral direction of this practical activity while aiming at the given target. By the way, it was Kotarbiński, who successfully promoted “Praxeology”, the philosophical and ethical idea of efficient activity, although, he did not refer to Pragmatists as the possible supporters of his concept. Also, Roman Ingarden, most influential representative of Polish phenomenology, had reservations about Pragmatism. While referring to James’s version of Pragmatism -- in the light of the problem of the objectivity/subjectivity of the perception of the objects external to the mind -- he saw such, as he called it, psychologistic and (psycho-) physiologistic concepts unable to explain the epistemological issues, and, moreover, included James into a more general tendency in Continental philosophy at that time (Bergson, Mach, Avenarius), calling it “pragmatic” or “pragmatistic” (without any reference to Peirce whatsoever), seemingly ignoring the specificity of the movement initiated in America.

The co-editors of the present volume invite Polish, American, and international scholars to revitalize this debate and look for some more definite results on the matter; however, it is not the co-editors’ intention to learn what Pragmatism is, to study its development, and to focus upon the elaborate systems of thought of Peirce, James, Royce, Dewey, Mead, and Rorty. Rather, the idea is to investigate the problem of axiological and evaluative aspects of the criteria of knowledge in confrontation to various philosophical positions so that it be possible for the scholars who do not necessarily belong to the Pragmatic camp to constructively utter their own views on the topic as well. What the co-editors expect from the collaborators, is to think of the possible results of these efforts from the point of view of the universal impact of the debate, that is to say, to propose some ways of solutions, and to enhance a further discussion amongst philosophers.

Jacquelyn Kegley and Krzysztof Skowroński